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ATTENTION AND COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY
Much has been written recently about cognitive penetration. If there are perceptual computations
that are directly influenced by the information content of certain cognitive states such that the
changes in the output of these computations can be accounted for in terms of the content of the
penetrating cognitive states, we can talk about the cognitive penetration of perceptual processing.1
When considering the possible mechanisms that could mediate cognitive penetration, attention,
traditionally, is quickly sidelined as a phenomenon that is trivially unable to exert the right kind
of effect on perception. Even if the allocation of goal-directed (top-down, endogenous) attention
is driven by the content of certain cognitive states (i.e., goal representations), it does not have a
direct influence on perceptual processing itself. For, according to the traditional characterization,
attention acts as a filter, a gatekeeper (Broadbent, 1958), or a spotlight (Posner, 1980) that selects
and enhances certain signals (corresponding to attended stimuli) while attenuating or filtering out
competing signals “prior to the operation of early vision” (Pylyshyn, 1999: p. 344).
This traditional understanding has recently been questioned by empirical findings
demonstrating that attention is not a passive gatekeeper mechanism acting before the start
of perceptual processing, but rather an active modulator of perceptual computations that is able to
exert many different effects at many different levels of the perceptual hierarchy (see e.g., Reynolds
and Chelazzi, 2004; Nanay, 2010b; Noudoost et al., 2010; Carrasco, 2011, 2014; Lupyan, 2015; Wu,
in press).
However, despite this transition from seeing attention as passive gatekeeper to seeing it as an
active modulator, opponents still argue against attention-mediated cognitive penetration on the
basis of the filter-like nature of attention. As Firestone and Scholl have recently put it, attending
is “importantly analogous to seeing through a tinted lens —merely increasing sensitivity to certain
features rather than others” (Firestone and Scholl, 2017: p. 23, but see also Lupyan, in press).
PRE-CUEING AND ATTENTIONAL MODULATION
Thinking about attention as a filter, even in the light of recent experimental data and conceptual
shift is supported by some of the empirical findings.
1See, for example, the much-cited passage from Zenon Phylyshyn: “if a system is cognitively penetrable then the function it
computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way
that bears some logical relation to what the person knows” (Pylyshyn, 1999: p. 343). Pylyshyn was interested in the cognitive
penetrability of early visual processing, whereas in contemporary discussion the emphasis has been shifted to perceptual
processing underlying conscious experiences (Macpherson, 2012, see also Teufel and Nanay, 2017 on the distinction). We
will concentrate on the former question here. Recently, Raftopoulos (2009, 2014) has offered a definition of early vision in
terms of perceptual processing occurring within 120 ms after stimulus presentation (see also Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis,
2015). Our focus on pre-cueing effects ensures that our claims are applicable even to this characterization of early visual
processing.
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At the behavioral level, attention increases processing
efficiency: The allocation of attention enhances detection rates,
speeds reaction times, increases accuracy (Posner, 1980; Posner
et al., 1980; Castiello and Umiltà, 1990; Carrasco, 2011). Neural
level studies suggest that attention achieves all these by enhancing
the neural signals encoding the stimulus-features in question,
i.e., by modulating the behavior of sensory neurons in various
ways, including amplifying neural responses (Carrasco, 2011),
sharpening response functions (Martinez-Trujillo and Treue,
2004; Maunsell and Treue, 2006), and remapping receptive fields
(Anton-Erxleben and Carrasco, 2013). Most importantly from
our present perspective, attention amplifies neural responses
via multiplicative effects like evoking response gain or contrast
gain, and also via additive effects like increasing baseline activity
(Buracas and Boynton, 2007; Carrasco, 2011; Cutrone et al.,
2014).
Pre-stimulus cues increase related baseline activity well before
the occurrence of the stimulus (Chawla et al., 1999; Reynolds
et al., 2000). This enhanced baseline or spontaneous activity
correlates with increased behavioral performance such that
subjects with large modulation of baseline activity perform
better once the stimulus is presented (Giesbrecht et al., 2006).
That is, with a pre-stimulus boost of the spontaneous activity
of neurons tuned toward a target the sensitivity of these
neurons is increased, and therefore stimulus processing is
enhanced.
One way of describing these findings, and one that is
standard in the literature, is that this is an attentional effect.
When attention is turned toward a specific spatial region
or a particular feature value, the activity of cortical neurons
selectively responding to the specific spatial region or particular
feature value increases. Pre-cueing studies show that this
can even be true without the presence of any stimuli in
the specific region or with the particular feature. In those
cases, top-down attentional modulation increases the activity
of those neurons which are sensitive to the spatial position or
feature value indicated by the endogenous pre-cue. Since this
process is driven by cognitive contents, this provides a nice
demonstration of the cognitive penetration of perception by
attention.
However, if we construe these studies this way, then the
concept of attention at play here will be attention that does
act very much like a filter—not as a mere gatekeeper simply
letting through some stimuli while blocking others, but as a more
advanced filter that is able to modulate certain features of the
light passing through it. Also note that attention exerts this effect
before stimulus presentation, i.e., well before the start of stimulus
processing. That is, in these cases it seems that the opponent
of attention mediated cognitive penetration could run a very
simple objection: Attention does not seem to affect perceptual
processing itself, not at least in a direct way; it only increases the
sensitivity of processing units, readying them for the stimuli to
come. In short, everything the pre-cueing studies show us about
attention would be consistent with a Pylyshyn-esque picture
of cognitive impenetrability: There are top-down attentional
effects at the entry-level of perceptual processing, but not
afterwards.
PRE-CUEING AND MENTAL IMAGERY
As we have seen, the claim that pre-cueing studies show that
perception is cognitively penetrated by means of attentional
mechanisms is problematic. Nevertheless, we do want to argue
that pre-cueing studies show that perception is cognitively
penetrated—not via the mediation of attention, but via mental
imagery. In what follows we will argue that cue-induced mental
imagery provides a channel through which cognitive states can
exert such effects on perception that fulfill the requirements of
cognitive penetration.
The concept of mental imagery has been controversial, but we
want to use a fairly non-demanding characterization, going back
to Kosslyn, Behrmann, and Jeannerod: “Visual mental imagery
is “seeing” in the absence of the appropriate immediate sensory
input, auditory mental imagery is “hearing” in the absence of
the immediate sensory input, and so on. Imagery is distinct
from perception, which is the registration of physically present
stimuli.” (Kosslyn et al., 1995, p. 1335). This is the sense in which
contemporary psychology and neuroscience (but not philosophy)
talks about mental imagery. Just one example from a recent
review article: “We use the term “mental imagery” to refer
to representations [...] of sensory information without a direct
external stimulus” (Pearson et al., 2015). We can summarize
this concept as “perceptual processing that is not triggered
by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense-
modality” (Nanay, 2016).
Note that mental imagery, understood this way does not
have to be voluntary, it is often involuntary (in flash-backs or
in the case of earworms). It does not have to be conscious
either (if sensory stimulation-driven perceptual processing can
be unconscious, then so can perceptual processing that is not
triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation). And while it
is typically driven by top-down information, it can also be
triggered laterally (by information in another sense modality)
or in a bottom-up manner (as in the case of the blind spot,
where the information is provided by the regions of the retina
around the blind spot). It is also important to note that by
“perceptual processing” what is meant in these definitions is
“early cortical processing”—in the case of the visual sense
modality, for example, we have early cortical activation in the
primary visual cortex that does not correspond to the retinal
activation.
Pre-cueing studies could be interpreted in this theoretical
framework as instances of mental imagery: Pre-cueing induces
early perceptual processing (as early as V1) that is not triggered
by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense
modality (that is, by corresponding retinal activation). In other
words, given the definition of mental imagery above, pre-cueing
induces mental imagery of the pre-cued feature. This is true of
pre-cueing for a number of features, such as shape, color, and
motion (see Shibata et al., 2008 for a good summary, see also
Zhuang and Papathomas, 2011).
Mental imagery interacts with the perceptual processing
of stimuli at all relevant stages of the perceptual hierarchy,
starting with the earliest one. Early cortical processing of
presented stimulus during mental imagery leads to a mixed
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 222
Fazekas and Nanay Pre-Cueing Effects: Attention or Mental Imagery?
imagery/perception state, where the activation of the V1, for
example, is partially determined by the visual stimulus and partly
by mental imagery. This is the clearest in the studies of illusory
contours, where the early perceptual processing of illusory
contours (in V1 and V2) is a mixture of amodal completion
(which comes out as mental imagery according to our definition)
and stimulus-driven processes (Kovács et al., 1995; Sugita, 1999;
Bakin et al., 2000; Lee and Nguyen, 2001; Komatsu, 2006; Hedgé
et al., 2008; Lommertzen et al., 2009; Vrins et al., 2009; Nanay,
2010a; Smith and Muckli, 2010; Bushnell et al., 2011; Shibata
et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Pan et al., 2012; Ban et al., 2013;
Emmanouil and Ro, 2014; Hazenberg et al., 2014; Scherzer and
Ekroll, 2015).
Some instances of amodal completion may be fully bottom-up
driven, like the completion of simple shapes purely on the basis of
Gestalt forms (that can go against our best judgments). But some
other times, amodal completion is driven in a top-down manner,
for example, in the case of seeing the cat behind the picket fence.
Depending on what cats I encountered before, the way I complete
this figure would be very different. The same goes for the amodal
completion of letters and words.
One experimentally controlled study of top-down driven
amodal completion (that is, mental imagery according to the
definition above) and the way it interacts with perception comes
from studies of how we perceive two-tone pictures before and
after information is given about what the picture is of Teufel et al.
(2015). Here, the mental imagery we use to complete the illusory
contours very much depends on top-down information and this
influences very early (V1) perceptual processing.
Because of the multiple and very early interactions between
the perceptual processing of stimuli and mental imagery, mental
imagery influences the way stimuli will get processed throughout
perception (as opposed to exerting modulatory effects only at the
input of early perceptual processing) thereby avoiding Pylyshyn-
esque lines of objection. And given that most instances of
mental imagery depend on content-driven top-down influences
(Macpherson, 2012), this means that mental imagery can
modulate perceptual computations in a direct, top-down, content
sensitive manner.
This is our argument for the claim that pre-cueing studies
show that perception is cognitively penetrated via mental
imagery. It is important to be clear about the relation between
attention and mental imagery here. We do not want to question
the role of attention in pre-cueing studies. After all, it is
attention that is being pre-cued. The pre-cue draws attention
to certain features, which via top-down connections induces
mental imagery for the pre-cued properties, which, then, after
stimulus-presentation, interacts with and influences the online
computations that process stimulus features. That is, what
mediates the cognitive penetration of perceptual processing is not
pre-cued attention, but cue-induced mental imagery.
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